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ABSTRACT
The authors examine the reasons why the Istanbul Stock Exchange’s initiative to 
promote better corporate governance among their listed companies has failed to 
take off, in contrast to the Novo Mercado’s success. After comparing the similarities 
and differences between Brazil and Turkey, the authors link Brazil’s success to 
the influence of a broader range of investors (including pension funds and foreign 
investors) than is the case in Turkey. Further, “the collaboration of the private and 
public sectors, under the leadership of private actors, was a distinct feature of the 
Novo Mercado,” the authors write. A weak legal foundation, few (if any) effective 
drivers of change, and the lack of sufficient incentives for the private sector are 
additional factors explaining why many companies in Turkey have yet to adopt 
corporate governance reforms. Having both a policy-making framework and policy 
reforms in place to support corporate governance reform is a key determinant of 
success, as the Novo Mercado experience illustrates.
INTRODUCTION
In the last 10 to 15 years, developed and emerging economies with weak corporate 
governance regimes have seen their securities markets lose listings and, hence, 
liquidity to international exchanges. Consequently, some exchanges began creating 
new “investor friendly” tiers and listing requirements. Others enacted reforms, 
including corporate governance codes, to protect minority shareholders. Most 
of these reforms chose “comply or explain” voluntary provisions and/or voluntary 
corporate governance codes, which provide more flexible, market-led regulations. 
Both reform efforts – voluntary listing tiers and codes – seek to share the control 
premium with minority shareholders as a means of encouraging equity investments.
In this commentary, we compare the objectives, processes, and outcomes of the 
different approaches adopted by the São Paolo Stock Exchange (BOVESPA) and 
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the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) for differentiating the “better governed” firms that 
have listed on their respective exchanges.
Maria Helena Santana’s case study on the Novo Mercado of BOVESPA and Petra 
Alexandru’s commentary on the Transparency Plus Tier (T+ Tier) of the Bucharest 
Stock Exchange (BVB) inspired us to review ISE’s decision to reject the Novo 
Mercado model and, instead, employ the Corporate Governance Index (CGI) in 
Turkey.
Launched in late December 2000, the Novo Mercado attracted more than 30 
companies within five years. In contrast, since its announcement in 2005, the CGI 
has yet to interest the five qualified companies needed to start calculating the index. 
The main reason is that ISE-listed companies lack interest in complying with a 
comprehensive list of corporate governance provisions. 
BRaZIl aNd tuRkeY:
theIR eCoNoMIeS, FINaNCIal MaRketS
Brazil and Turkey share similar development patterns and “democratic” traditions. 
Both belong to the French civil law tradition and suffer from an inefficient judiciary, 
weak enforcement, and the lack of a private litigation tradition. 
Over the last 20 years, Brazil and Turkey have been subjected to similar economic 
vulnerabilities, resulting from a series of domestic and international shocks that led 
to suspension of democratic processes. Both countries had to cope with domestic 
debt, prolonged periods of both high inflation and unemployment, and failed 
efforts to achieve sustainable growth. Highly unequal income distribution remains a 
pressing problem in both countries. 
Modern Turkey’s  Or ig ins
Modern Turkey was founded in 1923 from the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. 
Until 1945, the state was the major economic player and subsidized private-sector 
development. A pro-market policy started to emerge after 1945, but the state 
remained heavily involved in its country’s economy. In general, intervention by 
Turkey’s government over the past years was oriented towards short-term, palliative 
measures instead of much-needed, sustainable solutions to the economy’s 
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structural problems. This led to an evolving relationship between the state and the 
business sector—one that generally lacked trust.
In 1980, Turkey’s import substitution policies were replaced by an export-led 
stabilization and structural adjustment program. This program included the 
liberalization of capital markets, which was carried out between 1980 and 1989. 
The Capital Market Law was enacted in 1981, followed by the establishment of the 
Capital Market Board of Turkey (CMBT) in 1982.1 After five years of preparation, the 
ISE was reorganized and reopened in 1986.
From 1990 to 2000, Turkey was hit by economic crises, during which time the 
inflation rate averaged 75 percent. Following the long-awaited European Union 
decision granting official candidate status in 1999, Turkey’s worsening current 
account and the likelihood of a liquidity crisis forced the government to launch a 
major stabilization program with a stand-by IMF agreement. In late 2000, Turkey 
was eventually hit by a banking crisis, which was caused by liquidity problems, 
outright fraud, and related-lending issues. The IMF continued to support Turkey’s 
reforms with subsequent agreements signed in 2001 and 2004. The developments 
after 2000 are summarized in this commentary’s fourth section.
Prior to 2001, a long period of macroeconomic instability had reduced the 
probability of introducing corporate governance reforms in Turkey. Since 
2001, the EU and the IMF both remained strong anchors for reform, which 
included restructuring the banking sector at a cost of US$43 billion. In 2004, 
acknowledging the reform’s success, the EC recommended that the EU start 
accession negotiations with Turkey.2 The prospect of a sustainable, stable economy 
encouraged the government to continue with public-sector reforms, focusing on 
accountability, transparency (leading to improvements in the audit capacity and 
framework), and efficient tax regulations. Complementing the ongoing structural 
reforms in the public sector, CMBT initiated and led the process to improve the 
governance standards of listed companies.
1  Despite having some operational independence, CMBT is a semi-governmental agency overseeing the ISE. ISE’s structure is 
similar to that of BOVESPA on paper. It is owned by its members and governed by its general assembly. However, ISE’s operational 
independence has been questionable due to subsequent interventions from the government through CMBT, especially on fiscal 
matters. For example, the state-controlled listed companies did not fully comply with the guidelines and the privatization tenders 
made no reference to the guidelines.
2  Inflation fell to historic lows, political interference lessened, and the institutional and regulatory framework was aligned more closely 
with international standards, an important change towards a stable, rule-based economy. See: M. Ararat and M. Ugur. “Turkey, 
Corporate Governance at the Crossroads” in Chris Mallin (ed), Handbook on International Corporate Governance, Cheltenham, 
Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2005.
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Key Compar isons between Brazi l ,  Turkey
In the early 2000s, the Brazilian equity market was characterized by relatively low 
liquidity, high costs of capital, and limited growth in new capital. Compared to its 
Latin American neighbors, Brazil’s equity market was large, but market capitalization 
was concentrated in a small number of large companies.
A comparison of the Brazilian and Turkish financial markets is provided in Table 1, 
using time series data from 1990 to 2004. The ratio of stock market capitalization 
to GDP starts in 1990 at about the same level for both countries. While this ratio in 
Brazil exceeds Turkey’s in most years since 1990, by 2000, the difference becomes 
substantial, averaging nearly 39 percent for Brazil and 24 percent for Turkey. On the 
other hand, there was substantially less trading in Brazil than Turkey, as is indicated 
in the third and fourth columns (Brazil 13 percent vs. 32 percent in Turkey from 
2000 to 2004).
While a private bond market is virtually nonexistent in Turkey, this market’s 
capitalization relative to GDP was about 10 percent of Brazil in the 1990s. The 
size of the public bond markets in both countries is much higher. Turkey has a 
slightly larger bond market relative to GDP in the last three years of the sample 
period (1990-2004). The other proxies for gauging the status of financial market 
development at that time are the financial institutions’ ratios of private credit. (See 
Table 1.) These ratios suggest that Brazil has a more developed financial market. 
Both countries’ markets, though, were flooded with public borrowing, resulting in 
very high interest rates.
There were relatively few IPOs in both countries. Turkey had on average 24 IPOs 
per year from 1990 to 2000, but this number is much lower (seven per year) after 
2000. (See Table 2.)
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Table 1: Structure of Financial Systems in Brazil and Turkey, 2003-2004
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Table 2: The Development of the Stock Market in Turkey, 1990-2006
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1990 110 35 5.85 985.31 642.63 18737 8.30%
1991 134 24 8.50 319.63 501.50 15564 10.71%
1992 145 13 8.56 94.42 272.61 9922 7.72%
1993 160 17 21.77 152.45 833.28 37824 13.14%
1994 176 25 23.20 270.48 413.27 21785 18.60%
1995 205 30 52.35 246.78 382.62 20782 13.59%
1996 228 25 37.73 167.92 534.01 30797 15.20%
1997 258 31 58.10 420.38 982.00 61879 24.17%
1998 277 20 70.39 383.35 484.01 33975 16.92%
1999 285 10 84.03 87.41 1654.17 114271 59.70%
2000 315 36 181.93 2809.53 817.49 69507 33.82%
2001 310 1 80.40 0.24 557.52 47689 39.00%
2002 288 4 70.75 56.5 368.26 34402 20.00%
2003 285 2 100.16 11.30 778.43 69003 27.00%
2004 297 12 147.75 482.58 1075.12 98073 31.00%
2005 304 9 201.76 1743.96 1726.23 162814 45.00%
2006 316 15 229.64 930.50 1620.59 163774 51.00%
Source: Istanbul Stock Exchange, Annual Factbooks 1990-2006
3  Silvia M. Valadares and Ricardo P.C. Leal. 2000. Ownership Structure of Brazilian Companies. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=213409 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.213409 .
4  B. B. Yurtoglu, “Ownership, Control, and Performance of Turkish Listed Firms.” Empirica 27, no.2 (2000): 193-222. B. B. Yurtoglu, 
“Corporate Governance and Implications for Minority Shareholders in Turkey.” Journal of Corporate Ownership and Control no.1 
(2003): 72-86.
5  Ararat, Orbay, and Yurtoglu (2006)
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oWNeRShIp patteRNS: 
dIFFeReNCeS, SIMIlaRItIeS IN tWo peRIodS— 
the 1990s aNd 2000-2006
Both countries exhibit similar ownership patterns: businesses are organized 
into industrial groups and are largely controlled by families. Academicians Sylvia 
M. Valadares and Ricardo P. C. Leal analyze the direct and indirect ownership 
structures of listed Brazilian companies in 2000 and reported that3:
 1)  The ownership concentration is high, with the largest direct shareowner 
holding averaging 41 percent of equity capital.
 2) There are frequent violations of the one-share-one-vote rule.
 3)  Both non-voting shares and cross-ownership structures are used to 
achieve this violation. However, the role of non-voting shares is much more 
pronounced in Brazil.
 4)  Corporations are the most common investor category at the direct level. 
Families turn out to be the ultimate owners.
Similar patterns have been reported for Turkey in 2000 (A detailed account is 
provided in Table 2.)4:
 1)  Ownership concentration in Turkey is similar to that of Brazil, with the largest 
direct shareholder averaging 47 percent of equity capital.
 2)  In Turkey, there are frequent violations of the one-share-one-vote rule based 
on the use of share groups, which can exercise privileged control rights 
collectively.
 3)  Voting privileges and pyramids are both used to bypass the one-share-one-
vote rule. Pyramids are much more responsible for the wedge between 
voting and cash-flow rights.
 4)  Corporations and holding companies are the most common shareholder 
categories at the direct level. Families ultimately control about 80 percent of 
the listed companies primarily using pyramids.
Even as late as 2006, there is some evidence that the boards in both countries are 
ineffective and only play advisory roles.5
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For all the above reasons, there is also evidence that both countries suffer from 
low valuations for their firms. This large discount is due to the concentrated 
shareholding structures and deviations of cash-flow rights from voting rights. There 
is a large premium for controlling blocs, indicating a high level of private benefits for 
the controlling stake and expropriation of minority shareholders.
While the similarities between the two countries are far more pronounced than 
the differences, select key differences can be of substantial importance from a 
corporate governance reform perspective.
One such difference concerns the identity of minority shareholders. Local 
institutional shareholders, mainly pension funds and mutual funds, owned significant 
minority stakes in Brazil. As of 2000, these holdings amount to a little less than 
four percent at the direct ownership level and to almost five percent at the ultimate 
level.6
 While Brazil has a much longer history with privately managed pension funds, 
Turkey does not (they were introduced in 2000) so these funds play very limited 
roles. Table 6 provides an overview of pension-fund holdings using CMBT data. 
Pension funds controlled a portfolio totaling YTL295 million in 2004, with shares 
comprising about 13.32 percent of these holdings. The total portfolio increased 
to YTL2.7 billion in 2006, but the fraction in equity investments declined to 8.6 
percent.
 Foreign investors constitute an important investor category in Brazil. These 
investors have on average eight percent of the direct and 14 percent of the indirect 
holdings.7 These percentages are much lower in Turkey, where foreign shareholders 
have sizeable stakes in only 20 of the 218 listed companies. (See Table 3.)
This difference is mainly due to the relatively early start of privatization in Brazil, 
which led to a significant presence of foreign investors in BOVESPA in the 1990s. In 
Turkey, privatization led to similar results only after 2003.
Another important difference between Brazil and Turkey is the existence of different 
mechanisms used to increase the wedge between cash-flow and voting rights. 
6  Valadares and Leal, “Ownership Structure.” (2000).
7  Valadares and Leal, “Ownership Structure.”
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Table 3: Ownership and Control Structure of Turkish Listed Companies
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96 47.62 46.23 17.66 65.80 68.84 15.31 30.6 27.90 14.35
Non-financial 
companies
47 47.84 44.38 17.20 67.31 66.89 14.60 28.9 26.10 13.71
Financial 
companies
5 49.25 51.00 13.09 58.62 55.96 11.81 39.2 40.79 14.07
Families 42 34.11 28.20 22.64 52.22 54.10 24.20 38.3 29.30 25.96
Foreign 
companies
20 67.77 69.28 19.22 81.20 83.98 13.38 17.5 16.03 13.45
State 5 67.25 65.76 29.93 70.02 65.76 26.27 23 25.00 20.29
Miscellaneous 3 63.87 83.16 34.02 68.42 83.85 27.37 31.2 15.44 27.68
Total 218 47.63 45.47 21.07 64.89 67.23 18.85 30.5 26.11 17.96
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Families 173 66.10 66.23 21.54 54.04 56.61 22.84 7.47 1.00 49.84
Foreign 
companies
21 67.30 70.00 20.73 65.31 68.56 19.67 1.04 1.00 0.16
State 7 65.83 55.62 22.57 65.83 55.62 22.57 1.00 1.00 0.00
Miscellaneous 17 65.35 65.57 19.42 42.56 34.49 22.84 2.18 1.75 1.95
Total 218 66.15 66.30 21.20 54.61 55.92 22.98 6.23 1.00 44.44
Panel a: Direct OwnershiP
Panel B: Ultimate OwnershiP
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As of 2001, the use of non-voting preferred stocks is common in Brazil, allowing 
controlling shareholders to exercise control with less than one-third of their cash-
flow rights. Minority shareholders did not have voting rights at that time.
By comparison, controlling shareholders of Turkish companies use pyramidal 
structures and nomination privileges to increase their control. Most of the ISE-30 
companies predominantly have common shares. Pyramidal structures are not 
common in Brazil, whereas non-voting shares are not common in Turkey. Panel 
C of Table 3 shows the frequency of multiple shares (which are not necessarily 
non-voting shares, but offer some privileges to controlling shareholders) and other 
privileges reserved for controlling shareholders in Turkey. In 66 of the 218 listed 
industrial companies, there are more than two types of shares, while the frequency 
and extent of pyramidal structures is much more pronounced. Non-voting “shares” 
do exist in Turkey, but they are not part of the equity. So-called “founder shares” are 
coupled with “vouchers,” which allocate additional cash-flow rights to the founders 
without them having to provide an additional investment. In general, founder shares 
entitle the owners to a certain percentage of the company’s profits, independent of 
whether the general meeting of shareholders decides to distribute dividends. The 
use of founder shares may partly explain the low-dividend performance of Turkish 
companies.
One can also observe some differences in the propensity of Brazilian and Turkish 
firms to list abroad. In 2000, significant Brazilian companies listed abroad, which 
pulled liquidity out of BOVESPA and led to contraction in the local market. That 
Panel c: the FreqUency OF DUal class shares anD cOrPOrate charter arrangements
Number of Companies with N
One share one vote 125
Two types of shares with different voting rights 66
More than two types of shares with different voting rights 19
Special treatment in the distribution of earnings 24
Special treatment in the election of the board of directors 82
Special treatment in the election of the supervisors 41
Preemptive right to buy new issues of stock 13
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year, the volume traded on the US market by 28 Brazilian companies (representing 
5.6 percent of the 495 companies total on the BOVESPA) amounted to one-third of 
the entire volume traded on BOVESPA. In contrast, the effect of foreign listings was 
much less significant in Turkey since there was only one large issuer on the New 
York Stock Exchange and another on the London Stock Exchange at that time.
Another important difference deals with de-listings at BOVESPA and ISE. It was 
possible to de-list from BOVESPA, which experienced a significant number of de-
listings in the late 1990s. Turkey’s stock-exchange regulations make it practically 
impossible to deregister from ISE.8
Yet another difference concerns the development of non-governmental initiatives 
in both countries. Whereas such initiatives date back to 1995 in Brazil with the 
founding of IBGC (Instituto Brasileiro de Governança Corporativa), similar efforts 
started much later in Turkey with the launch of TUSIAD’s Corporate Governance 
task force in 2001, the Corporate Governance Forum of Turkey (CGFT) at Sabanci 
University in 2002, and the Corporate Governance Association (TKYD) in 2003.
ChaNGeS aFteR 2000:
Novo MeRCado – WhY oR WhY Not? 
As described above, ISE experienced problems similar to those faced by BOVESPA 
before its launch of the Novo Mercado. There were no IPOs, trading volume was 
at historic lows, and issuers were complaining about compliance costs. ISE was 
exploring the idea of encouraging IPOs by establishing a separate market for small 
to medium-size companies with less strict criteria.9 A separate market tier with 
tighter corporate governance requirements did not appeal to ISE for the following 
reasons: 
 a)  Only the largest and most liquid companies who target international 
institutional investors would be interested in, and capable of, complying with 
stricter criteria. The main market would be heavily discounted and dwarfed if 
these firms were to be excluded.10
8  This resulted in “listed” companies, whose traded shares diminished to less than one percent.
9  CMBT was not supportive of this idea.
10   The 30 companies that were considered to be the potential constituencies of a corporate governance segment constituted 80 
percent of the market value
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 b)  There were reputational risks; issuers might not be interested in the index 
since there were no explicit signs of interest from investors.
 c)  Operational difficulties and resource requirements for a separate market 
would be substantial; ISE and CMBT both had resource shortages.
When ISE considered the Novo Mercado, the approach was found lacking in 
two principal respects in 2000: first, its listing criteria seemed too simplistic; and, 
second, Novo Mercado had only one listing and did not appear to be a success.
The Corporate Governance Committee established by the CMBT had considered 
four alternatives to promote voluntary improvements in the governance of listed 
companies: 
	 •	indexing	based	on	ratings	by	independent	rating	agencies;	
	 •	a	separate	market;
	 •	indexing	based	on	CMBT	ratings;	and,	
	 •	award	systems.
CMBT wanted to act quickly. A separate market tier of the ISE would require a 
longer preparation period, whereas an index could be launched as soon as there 
was a sufficient number of qualifying companies. CMBT ratings qualification was 
not supported for various reasons: methodology development would need skills 
and expertise that CMBT did not have; and, maintaining the index would require 
permanent resources, including a substantial commitment of staff time.
By 2003, the credit-rating agencies Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings were 
actively promoting corporate governance scoring services in Turkey. Deminor, a 
Brussels-based corporate governance rating firm (later acquired by Institutional 
Shareholder Services), was also active in the market. CMBT opted to use 
independent rating agencies (or their licensees). This was considered to be a faster, 
less costly, and less risky approach than a separate market segment like the Novo 
Mercado.
CMBT’s decision was based on the assumption that the corporate governance 
scoring methodologies would converge as the quality of corporate governance 
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becomes an important investment criteria for global investors. CMBT believed that 
compliance with the Corporate Governance Guidelines would indicate compliance 
with internally accepted standards. Another assumption was that the Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSRO) would offer corporate 
governance rating services in Turkey.11 Since NRSRO activities are strictly monitored 
by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, local monitoring would not be 
needed. Furthermore, the qualified companies would appeal to global investors.
Subsequently, the NRSROs unanimously decided to incorporate corporate 
governance assessments into credit rating methodologies and stopped offering 
corporate governance scoring as a separate service. Based on various informal 
discussions with NRSRO representatives, our view is that corporate governance 
“ratings” exposed the rating agencies to significant reputational risks without an 
attractive return. CMBT responded by releasing the requirement of an “international 
rating methodology” for certifying rating agencies. Since then, two local agencies 
have been established.
Since the launch of the Corporate Governance Index and the 2005 decree, three 
Turkish companies commissioned corporate governance rating agencies. Isbank 
used Core in 2005, while both Dogan Yayin Holding and Vestel commissioned ISS 
in 2006 and 2007.
According to market participants, the three companies’ scores did not have 
credibility for two reasons. First, all three companies received very high scores (8 – 
9 out of 10), but the reports did not seem to capture the issues that mattered most 
to local investors. One reason explaining this outcome is the rating agencies’ use 
of foreign analysts to meet CMBT’s requirements. (According to the CMBT rating 
decree, analysts must be certified by passing a CMBT exam and they must have 
three years of corporate governance rating experience with an international firm. 
This sharply limited the pool of qualified local analysts.) The foreign analysts were 
not familiar with the local context. Their published reports could not capture the 
complex relations within Turkish business groups and the influence exercised by 
controlling shareholders through pyramidal structures and informal mechanisms 
since the guidelines are designed to focus on single companies. In fact, one of 
11   In the US, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) permits the use of credit ratings from certain credit-rating agencies for 
certain regulatory purposes. Those agencies whose ratings are permitted to be used for these regulatory purposes are referred 
to “Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations” (or “NRSROs”). The SEC grants NRSRO recognition, administers 
these agencies’ registration, and surveils their activities.
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the published corporate governance rating reports notes that their score reflects 
“compliance with the guidelines” and is not to be confused with a corporate 
governance rating.
Corporate  Governance Guide l ines Launched 
ISE remained an observer when CMBT launched the Corporate Governance 
Guidelines in 2003. Based on the OECD’s Corporate Governance Principles, 
these guidelines provide recommendations for listed companies’ governance on 
a “comply or explain” basis. The guidelines consist of more than 100 provisions 
grouped under four headings: Shareholder Rights; Disclosure and Transparency; 
Board Responsibilities and Processes; and, Stakeholder Relations. CMBT’s efforts 
were neither blocked nor wholeheartedly supported by the government12 since 
the focus of the Turkish government’s investment promotion strategy has been 
on attracting foreign direct investments.13 Since the public initiative was poorly 
coordinated, the private sector remained skeptical. CMBT spent considerable 
effort to establish a private-sector dialogue, but they could only engage with 
salaried managers rather than the owner-managers (controlling shareholders). The 
process was not effective because consultation is not part of the Turkish political 
traditions. Further, there is a lack of trust between the state and the private sector, 
as explained earlier. Pension funds were just starting, foreign ownership in listed 
companies was negligible, and the media was not yet interested in corporate 
governance matters. The CGFT14, a new initiative, was the main private entity that 
actively supported CMBT’s efforts.
During the year following the guidelines’ launch, the response from listed companies 
in adapting the voluntary principles was disappointing. Very few 
companies made any reference to CMBT’s guidelines in their 2003 annual reports. 
In order to improve compliance in 2004, CMBT introduced mandatory reporting 
12   For example, the state-controlled listed companies did not fully comply with the guidelines, and the privatization tenders made 
no reference to the guidelines.
13   Unfortunately, the lack of coordination between public offices and agencies has been a persistent problem in Turkey. For 
example; while CMBT was busy with improving the regulatory framework for listed companies, the Banking Regulatory and 
Supervisory Agency (BDDK) was also working on improving the corporate governance regime of the financial institutions. 
Meanwhile, a committee established by the Ministry of Justice had been working on a draft Commercial Code for years. The 
cooperation among BDDK, CMBT, and the commission set up by the Ministry of Justice was limited. Nevertheless, the draft 
recognized CMBT’s regulatory authority on corporate governance for all joint stock companies.
14   A research and advocacy center co-founded in 2002 by the Turkish Businessmen and Industrialists Association and Sabanci 
University.
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based on a standard report template. Starting with the 2004 annual reports, listed 
companies had to outline how they were in compliance with CMBT’s guidelines, 
using the CMBT template. The report had to explain which provisions the issuers 
had complied with and which ones they hadn’t done so (the reasons why and the 
actions they planned to comply). Unfortunately, the quality of compliance reports in 
the 2004 annual reports and the guidelines’ implementation were both disappointing, 
according to a CMBT survey. These efforts had created some awareness, but there 
were neither strong incentives nor sanctions to compel compliance.
The guidelines’ legal foundation was weak. Although drafting of the modern 
company laws had started as early as 2000 in Turkey, the guidelines preceded 
modernization of the commercial code. The guidelines were envisaged as a road 
map for improvements in shareholders’ legal protections. The draft Commercial 
Code, which was expected to be enacted in early 2006, introduced a completely 
new framework and pro-market approach for joint stock companies to support the 
guidelines. However, the draft was blocked by the opposition in parliament.15
In Brazil, banking reforms preceded the new Company Law (2001) and the 
voluntary corporate governance code (2002). Although the Company Law was 
subject to political interventions and changed considerably before enactment, it 
provided a better foundation for regulatory and incentive-based systems.
After much reflection on ways to promote corporate governance ratings as a 
market-based alternative to regulations, CMBT announced CGI at the end of 
2004. Those listed companies that complied with the guidelines, as determined 
by independent rating agencies, would be included in the index. The idea of 
differentiating “better governed” companies by including them in a separately 
tracked index was not fully supported by ISE, but, the exchange followed the 
regulator’s instructions.16 ISE’s March 2005 press release announced that the CGI 
would be launched as soon as five companies qualified. Qualification requires that 
a company receive a corporate governance score of six out of 10 by the rating 
agencies. Qualified companies are entitled to a 50-percent discount on listing fees, 
which in most cases covers the rating agency’s costs.
15   The basis of opposition was that the draft mandated that all joint stock companies use IFRS and engage external audit. The 
Social Democrats argued that this would increase the dominance of Big Four audit firms and have a negative effect on the 
role of independent accountants, who are not familiar with IFRS. The government and the opposition were forced to reopen 
parliamentary discussions in March 2007 as a response to criticism from TUSIAD.
16   The reluctance is obvious when the Turkish and English Websites of ISE are compared: the English version does not mention 
CGI, whereas it is mentioned at the top of the Turkish Website.
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ReFleCtIoNS oN the dRIveRS oF ReFoRM: 
the CoRpoRate GoveRNaNCe INdex expeRIeNCe 
aNd ItS outlook 
The Novo Mercado was led by BOVESPA, a non-profit institution owned by 
brokerage firms. But, unlike the CMBT case, it was officially supported by other 
private actors and beneficiaries from its inception. The Brazilian Institute of 
Corporate Governance (IBGC) and the Private Sector Advisory Group (PSAG)17 
lent their credibility and prestige to the idea within the network of major global 
institutional investors. Another private actor was the National Association of 
Investment Banks (ANBID), which mandated that its members could only lead 
underwriting offerings for issuers that are registered, at a minimum, on Novo 
Mercado Level One. The support from the private sector was complemented by 
public entities, such as the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), the Brazilian 
Securities and Exchange Commission (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários, CVM), 
and the agency responsible for oversight of Brazilian pension funds (SPC). The 
collaboration of the private and public sectors, under the leadership of private 
actors, was a distinct feature of the Novo Mercado.
The main drivers for Novo Mercado seem to be from within: demands from 
institutional shareholders and foreign investors to revitalize BOVESPA and stop 
the flight of Brazil’s best companies to NYSE. In contrast, the drivers for reforms 
in Turkey were external (IMF stand-by financing and the EU), and the main actors 
were public institutions and the government. In Brazil, private actors were involved 
and provided thought leadership. Above all, Brazil had in place a policy framework 
that support corporate governance and guided policy reforms, another key factor in 
Novo Mercado’s success.
17   The Private Sector Advisory Group of the IFC Global Corporate Governance Forum is comprised of more than 70 of the 
world’s most prominent experts on corporate governance. Advisors volunteer their time and expertise to help implement better 
corporate governance practices in developing and transition countries. Members include corporate executives, board members, 
investors, lawyers, accountants, and financial journalists from developed and developing countries. Learn more: www.gcgf.org.
18  http://www.spk.gov.tr/ofd/KurumsalYonetim/index.html?tur=calistay
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As recently as 2006, the general view of market participants, experts, and 
academics on the subject was expressed in a workshop organized by CMBT. Here 
is what they said18:
 a)  They do not expect CGI to meet its objectives, even if five companies 
eventually qualify.
 b) The CGI and its selection criteria should be reviewed.
 c)  Although CMBT provided a weighting for each of the four headings of the 
guidelines, the respective weight of individual provisions under one heading 
is left to the rating companies to decide. This approach may introduce 
inconsistencies. The criteria for qualification and the weighting of each 
criterion should not be left to rating agencies but should be specified by 
CMBT.
 d)  The idea of a separate market based on additional listing requirements, 
such as the Novo Mercado with its corporate governance levels, should be 
reconsidered.
Moreover, since the launch of the guidelines and the index, foreign ownership in 
ISE-listed companies has significantly increased due to both direct investments 
and portfolio investments resulting from rising demand for Turkish assets. Turkey 
experienced a significant number of mergers and acquisitions where control has 
been transferred to foreign shareholders with premiums reaching 100 percent in 
some cases. High control premiums led to high prices for mandatory bids, which 
were eagerly accepted by minority shareholders. As a result, the percentage of 
traded shares was drastically reduced and the burden of complying with ISE 
regulations was hardly justified.
BOVESPA’s Novo Mercado approach captures the key issues identified specifically 
by investors. Therefore, the better market performance of Novo Mercado 
companies comes as no surprise, although further research is needed to 
understand the long-term effects on returns.
The Novo Mercado case provides convincing evidence that consultation with 
major institutional investors on the requirements and soliciting their support for 
reform, including the CGI, is a very important step. It is also a step that may be 
more challenging since Turkey lacks the business and political traditions that Brazil 
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had, which include experience in building consensus. Cultural differences, then, 
are among the most important determinants of success in ushering in market-led 
corporate governance reforms. After comparing the similarities and differences 
between Brazil and Turkey, the authors link Brazil’s success to the influence of a 
broader range of investors (including pension funds and foreign investors) than is 
the case in Turkey. Those investors in Brazil participated in a policy-making process 
that drove corporate governance reforms, including the Novo Mercado.
Recommendations for Istanbul Stock Market’s Corporate Governance Index 
We recommend combining the ISE 
and Novo Mercado approaches. A 
company that receives a score of six 
or more out of 10 can be included in 
the index regardless of the specific 
guidelines that it meets or doesn’t meet. 
In our view, inclusion should be subject 
to full compliance with relatively few 
key criteria (related with sine-qua-non 
issues such as shareholder rights and 
accountability of insiders). These criteria 
should be identified in consultation 
with international and local institutional 
shareholders. The Novo Mercado case 
provides convincing evidence that 
consultation with major institutional 
investors on the requirements and 
soliciting their support for the index 
may be very important. A corporate 
governance assessment report may 
be required to provide further insight 
into a company’s level of compliance 
with more than 100 provisions of the 
guidelines.
Those companies that do not like the 
idea of exposing themselves to outside 
scrutiny by involving a CG rating 
agency may signal commitment to 
good governance by announcing their 
compliance. 
We provide the following set of 
requirements to determine if companies 
qualify for the index:
a)  Minimum free float of 25 percent at 
any one time
b)  Minimum 500 shareholders at any 
one time
c)  Disclosure of ultimate ownership at 
the level of real persons
d)  Disclosure of ownership of “groups of 
shares” with board nomination rights
e)  Requirement to disclose board 
nominations before the general 
assembly if there exist shareholder 
agreements on nomination rights
f)  Filing of all shareholder agreements 
with ISE immediately after signing
g) No founder shares
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TO LEaRN MORE ONLINE
h)  A commitment to external audit of all 
transactions between related parties 
exceeding a predefined value
i)  General assembly approval for 
mergers and major transactions, 
including sale of assets above a 
certain value
j)  A maximum wedge (deviation of cash 
flow rights from control rights)
k) No non-voting shares
l)  Disclosure of direct or indirect 
ownership interests exceeding five 
percent up to the ultimate level of real 
person shareholders
m)  Disclosure of contracts with related 
parties—e.g., above one percent of 
company’s net worth, based on a 
clear definition of related parties by 
the regulator
Corporate Governance Codes and 
Principles – Turkey
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/code.
php?code_id=117 
Corporate Governance of Turkey at 
Sabanci University
http://cgft.sabanciuniv.edu/eng
CGFT is a reserach and advocacy 
center hosted by Sabanci Univesity 
Faculty of Management focused on 
empirical research.
Report on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC). 
Corporate Governance Country 
Assessment for Turkey. April 2004.  
The World BankGroup.
http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_cg_
turkey.html
This Corporate Governance 
Assessment was completed as part 
of the joint World Bank-IMF Reports 
on the Observance of Standards and 
Codes (ROSC). This report benchmarks 
the country’s observance of corporate 
governance against the OECD 
Principles. CHECK.
Istanbul Stock Exchange
http://www.ise.org 
Turkish Corporate Governance 
association 
www.cogat.org 
In 2003, the Turkish Corporate 
Governance Association was 
established; its mission is to raise 
awareness by training the various 
corporate players on how to enable 
good corporate governance based on 
existing principles, with the main issues 
in the Turkish business environment 
being board effectiveness.
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Turkish Securities Regulator
http://spk.gov.tr
Turkish Stock Market Investors 
association (BORYaD)
http://www.boryad.org/English.htm 
Established in April 2001, Turkish 
Stock Market Investors Association is 
the first and only civil organization that 
represents the rights of more than two 
million investors. 
Oganization for Economic Co-
operation and Development 
http://www.oecd.org/document/49/0,3
343,en_2649_34813_31530865_1_1_1
_1,00.html
Download a copy of the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance 
in Arabic, Azerbaijani, English, French, 
German, Italian, Japanese, Polish, 
Portuguese, Russian, Serbian, and 
Spanish. 
Corporate Governance in Turkey: a 
Pilot Study
http://www.oecd.org/document/6/0,33
43,en_2649_37439_37490374_1_1_1_
37439,00.html
The 2006 report examines the extent to 
which the OECD Principles have been 
implemented in Turkey.
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